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Summary  Middle  East  Respiratory  Syndrome  (MERS)  coronavirus  is  the  most  recent
among  the  Coronaviridae  family  to  jump  species  and  infect  humans.  Major  health-
care  associated  MERS  outbreaks  have  occurred  in  the  Middle  East  and  Korea  that
affected  both  patients  and  healthcare  workers.  These  outbreaks  were  characterized
by  intra  and  inter-hospital  spread  and  were  exacerbated  speciﬁcally  by  overcrowd-
ing,  delayed  diagnosis  and  appropriate  use  of  personal  protective  equipment.  Recent
experience  with  this  virus  emphasizes  the  importance  of  compliance  with  infection
control  practices  and  with  other  interventions  addressing  patient  triage,  placement
and  ﬂow  within  and  between  healthcare  facilities.  Our  Achilles  heel  remains  com-
pliance  with  the  best  infection  prevention  practices  and  their  harmonization  with
patient  ﬂow.  Both  infection  prevention  compliance  and  maintenance  of  patient
ﬂow  are  critical  in  preventing  healthcare-associated  transmission  of  many  of  these
emerging  infectious  diseases,  including  MERS.
©  2016  Published  by  Elsevier  Limited  on  behalf  of  King  Saud  Bin  Abdulaziz  University
for  Health  Sciences.
b
p
c
s
d
i
m
[Middle  East  Respiratory  Syndrome  (MERS)  corona-
virus  is  the  most  recent  among  the  Coronaviridae
family to  jump  species  and  infect  humans  [1].
Despite the  potential  role  of  camels  in  disease
transmission, the  current  burden  of  the  virus  lies
in its  association  with  healthcare-based  outbreaks
[2,3,4].  To  date,  the  majority  of  cases  have  been
identiﬁed in  the  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia.  Hospital
outbreaks  emphasize  the  importance  of  compliance
with infection  control  standards,  where  not  only  the
obvious practices  of  hand  hygiene  and  proper  use  of
personal protective  equipment  (PPE)  are  important
p
o
A
o
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jiph.2016.04.006
1876-0341/© 2016 Published by Elsevier Limited on behalf of King Saut  other  interventions  addressing  patient  triage,
lacement  and  ﬂow  within  and  between  health-
are facilities  are  also  critical  to  preventing  disease
pread.  The  largest  reported  outbreak  was  in  Jed-
ah, Saudi  Arabia,  in  the  spring  of  2014,  where  255
ndividuals  were  diagnosed  with  MERS  and  an  esti-
ated 97.3%  were  healthcare-associated  infections
2]. One-third  of  the  cases  were  among  healthcare
roviders. A  more  recent  outbreak  in  the  Republic
f Korea  was  traced  back  to  one  traveler  from  the
rabian  Peninsula,  and  again,  a substantial  portion
f infections  was  associated  with  healthcare  [3].
ud Bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences.
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Areventing  healthcare-associated  transmission  of  th
oot  causes  of  this  outbreak  included  delayed  case
ecognition,  overcrowding  in  emergency  rooms,
nd ‘‘doctor  shopping’’.  The  recent  outbreak  in
ur hospital  in  Riyadh,  Saudi  Arabia,  in  August  and
eptember  2015  was  traced  to  delayed  recogni-
ion of  MERS  cases,  overcrowding  of  the  Emergency
epartment and  incomplete  adherence  to  infec-
ion control  practices,  such  as  the  use  of  barrier
recautions and  hand  hygiene  [5]. These  outbreaks
id not  only  lead  to  patient-level  morbidity  and
ortality  but  they  also  had  substantial  economic,
ocial and  even  political  impacts.  Importantly,  the
bility of  hospitals  to  provide  care  for  routine  ill-
esses was  clearly  jeopardized  during  these  MERS
utbreaks.  Additionally,  as  in  the  past  outbreaks  of
evere Acute  Respiratory  Syndrome  (SARS),  fears
mong  healthcare  workers  of  becoming  infected
hile caring  for  infected  patients  led  to  a  signiﬁ-
ant psychological  and  emotional  burden  [6]. The
ecent MERS  outbreaks  are  reminiscent  of  SARS  in
003, H1N1  in  2009  and  even  some  clusters  of  avian
nﬂuenza.  These  recent  MERS  outbreaks  stress,
et again,  the  vulnerability  of  healthcare  systems
o the  threat  of  emerging  respiratory  pathogens.
hese threats  are  not  over;  and  the  most  likely  run-
er up  candidate  for  an  outbreak  would  be  a  newly
hifting  inﬂuenza  virus  [7].
Are hospitals  and  health  systems  ready  for  such
 challenge?  Unfortunately,  they  are  not.  A  new
eport  indicated  that  more  than  half  of  U.S.  states
re poorly  prepared  to  respond  to  infectious  disease
utbreaks  [8].  For  example,  to  better  understand
ractices that  would  facilitate  primary  prevention
mong healthcare  providers  and  patients,  consider
nﬂuenza  vaccination.  In a  survey  of  infection  pre-
ention  and  control  specialists  at  386  U.S.  hospitals,
nly 43  percent  indicated  that  inﬂuenza  vaccina-
ions were  mandatory  for  all  health  care  providers
n their  hospitals  or  clinic  settings  [9]. Only  1.3
ercent  of  Veterans  Affairs  hospitals  required  all
ealthcare  providers  to  obtain  an  inﬂuenza  vac-
ine [9].  Studies  demonstrate  that  many  hospitals
n the  USA  lack  negative  pressure  rooms  and  lack
urge  capacity  for  health  care  providers  and  med-
cal equipment/supplies  in  regard  to  preparedness
or emerging  infectious  diseases  [10,11].  Likewise,
any  hospitals  around  the  globe  are  not  prepared
o manage  a  surge  of  cases  of  Acute  Respiratory
nfections (ARIs).  In  a  study  of  325  Asian  ICUs,
3.4% did  not  have  single  rooms  and  36.7%  did  not
ave negative-pressure  rooms  [12]. In  a  study  in
hina, only  2.2%  of  hospitals  had  all  of  the  PPE
eeded to  protect  healthcare  providers,  and  only
0.6% reported  that  their  health  care  staff  had
een trained  in  hospital  emergency  preparedness
or infectious  disease  events  [10].
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Compliance  with  infection  prevention  and  con-
rol practices  is  our  Achilles  heel  and  is critical
n preventing  healthcare-associated  transmission  of
any of  these  emerging  infectious  diseases,  includ-
ng MERS.  Despite  many  strengths  in  our  healthcare
ystems, the  root  causes  of  transmission  of  sev-
ral recent  respiratory  viral  infections  has  been
oor  compliance  with  approaches  to  respiratory
llness. A  universal  approach  to  all  patients  pre-
enting  with  ARI  has  been  recommended  by  the
orld Health  Organization  (WHO)  and  the  Centers
or Disease  Control  (CDC)  [13,14]. Early  identiﬁca-
ion and  diagnosis  of  ARI  is  key  to  prompt  isolation
nd the  only  methods  to  ensure  an  interruption
n the  chain  of  transmission.  Yet,  early  diagno-
is and  isolation  are  commonly  delayed.  For  that
eason,  we  should  refocus  our  efforts  and  ensure
hat patients  with  ARI  symptoms  are  placed  in
roplet  and  contact  isolation.  Even  if  MERS  has  been
rimarily  diagnosed  in  the  Arabian  Peninsula;  physi-
ians around  the  world  need  to  have  a low  index
f suspicion  for  patients  presenting  with  respira-
ory illness.  Remember,  avian  inﬂuenza  was  linked
o Asian  countries  yet,  H1N1  emerged  in  Mexico
13,14]. Healthcare  providers  need  to  be  taught  to
hink critically,  to  be  aware  of  the  association  of
hese various  infections  with  different  geographic
arts of  the  world  and  to  be  aware  of  their  case
eﬁnitions when  dealing  with  ARI  cases.
The WHO  recommends  that  patients  with  sus-
ected  or  conﬁrmed  MERS  be  isolated  under  droplet
nd contact  precautions  using  eye  protection;  and
hat patients  be  placed  in  airborne  isolation  when
erforming  aerosol  generating  procedures  (AGPs),
hereas  the  CDC  recommends  airborne  isolation  for
ll suspected  and  conﬁrmed  cases  of  MERS  [14].
his discordance  in  recommendations  may  reﬂect
he availability  of  resources,  yet  leads  to  confusion
mong providers.  Our  experience  has  shown  that  a
odiﬁed approach  balances  resources  and  risk.  We
aw no  transmission  when  placing  suspected  cases
n droplet  isolation  with  the  exclusive  use  of  air-
orne isolation  when  performing  an  AGP  and  saw
o transmission  for  conﬁrmed  cases  when  following
hese practices  (unpublished  data).  Hence,  we  feel
hat these  decisions  can  be  based  on  the  availability
f resources  and  also  on  a good  patient-by-patient
isk assessment.
 hospital-based Respiratory Protection
rogram (RPR)
o  comply  with  the  above  recommendations  for
reventing  healthcare  transmission  of  respiratory
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Table  1  Examples  of  elements  under  the  three  pillars  of  infection  prevention  and  control  in  the  healthcare  setting.
Element Pillar Examples
I. Policy and procedure
Governance • Committee/department
◦ Multidisciplinary
◦ Reporting directly to highest level of leadership
◦ Deﬁned authority and accountability
Policy and practices • Management of employee database for ease of contact tracing
◦ Serology status to blood borne pathogens
◦ Immunization status
◦ Respiratory ﬁt testing status
◦ Latent TB status
• Hand hygiene
• Standard precautions
• Extended precautions
• Policy
◦ Outbreak management
◦ Isolation and barrier precautions
◦ Aseptic technique
◦ Cleaning, disinfection and sterilization
◦ Supplies and their reuse
• Contact tracing
•  Surveillance and data management
II. Facility and human resources
The infection control team •  Trained and experienced infection control ofﬁcers and hospital
epidemiologists
• Infection preventionists, 1/100 acute care beds and 1/200 non-acute care
beds
Respiratory triage areas • Early recognition of and separation of patients with respiratory illness
from those with no respiratory illness
• Establishing isolation facilities where patients with respiratory illness can
be evaluated and treated separately from those with no respiratory illness
Inpatient facility • Single bedded rooms are preferred
• Cohort policies when single bedded rooms not available
• Running clean water sinks, soap, should be available
• Alcohol-based hand hygiene rub or gel be as a hand hygiene solution
Negative pressure rooms (NPRs) • NPRs are necessary for airborne isolation
• The facility has the ability to expand on NPRs if needed. Incase of surge
of respiratory illness patients
• NPRs should be regularly monitored according to policy
Single bedded isolation rooms • For droplet and contact isolation
Consumables related to IPC
practices
• Personal protective equipment (PPE) should always be available:
◦ Masks
◦ Gowns
◦ Water proof gowns
◦ Gloves
◦ Goggles/face shields
• Soap
•  Hand hygiene dispensers and alcohol-based hand rub
CSSD facility • Policies in place to assure evidence-based cleaning, disinfection and
sterilization of equipment
• Consider no-touch technologies to enhance cleaning
• Abandon reuse of single-use items without a clear policy
III. Behavior, accountability and leadership
Education • Monthly, quarterly, annual
• Hands-on, practice-based training
• Online training
Competency evaluation • Certiﬁed competency evaluation as part of the educational processes
Example setting • Visible leadership presence
• Leaders as role models
Rewarding of exemplary
performance
•  Setting an accountability hierarchy
HH: hand hygiene, ABHR: alcohol-based hand rubs.
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Korea. Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives;reventing  healthcare-associated  transmission  of  th
athogens,  hospitals  must  develop  a  system-wide
nd systematic  approach  to  ensure  that  there  is
n understanding  of  respiratory  pathogens  as  well
s their  diagnoses,  and  hospitals  must  empower
uch programs  to  prepare  and  respond  to  emerg-
ng respiratory  diseases.  Healthcare  leadership  will
eed to  balance  the  cost  and  beneﬁt  of  investing
n such  programs.  Developing  a  RPP  for  enhanced
reparedness to  new  infectious  and  unexpected
espiratory outbreaks  and  pandemics  requires  that
he infection  control  programs  redeﬁne  their  roles
nder three  main  pillars:  policy  and  procedure,
acility preparedness  and  accountability  and  lead-
rship, Table  1.  A  RPP  would  be  essential  to  address,
t a  minimum,  the  availability  of  proper  isolation
acility, equipment  and  supplies,  including  soap
nd water,  alcohol  based  hand  gel,  masks  and  res-
irators.  The  latter  requires  proper  ﬁtting  of  all
t-risk  healthcare  providers.  Further  considerations
ould include  the  availability  of  alternatives  for
espirators,  such  as  the  Powered  Air  Purifying  Res-
irators (PAPRs),  which  require  proper  cleaning
nd storage,  as  well  as  training  on  their  usage.
ssessing the  capacity  for  airborne  isolation  is  a
ajor intervention,  but  a  necessary  one.  Some
ealthcare facilities  will  have  to  build  new  facili-
ies  or  renovate  old  ones  to  fulﬁll  airborne  isolation
equirements [14].
As a  part  of  their  disaster  preparedness,  health-
are facilities  should  have  a  speciﬁc  plan  to
ddress possible  infectious  disease  disaster  scenar-
os. Among  the  top  infectious  scenarios  are:  the
mergence  of  a  novel  respiratory  pathogen;  a viral
emorrhagic  pathogen,  such  as  Ebola  (EHV);  or  an
gent with  the  potential  to  be  used  in  a  bioter-
orism attack,  such  as  anthrax  or  smallpox.  The
nfectious  disease  disaster  plan  (IDDP)  will  have
nique  elements  that  depend  on  the  characteristics
f the  pathogen,  its  transmission  and  the  presence
f effective  mitigation  strategies.  Hence,  an  IDDP
ould need  to  be  accompanied  by  special  drills
o ensure  the  full  preparedness  of  the  facility  and
taff. Such  drills  would  lead  to  clariﬁcation  of  indi-
idual roles,  the  reﬁnement  of  incident  command
tructure and  the  development  of  needed  train-
ng materials  and  policies.  Such  a  plan  would  also
eed to  be  integrated  and  practiced  at  many  lev-
ls of  the  healthcare  system.  At  a  minimum,  it
ould be  practiced  as  a  tabletop  exercise,  but  more
ffectively,  it  should  be  practiced  at  the  hospital
evel, at  the  health  system  level,  and  at  the  city,
egional and  national  levels,  if  possible.  In  essence,
n IDDP  needs  to  be  adopted  at  the  national  level
o ensure  support  and  sharing  of  human  and  non-
uman resources  [15].ERS  211
In  summary,  an  outbreak  can  be  taken  as  an
pportunity to  assess  readiness  and  build  capacity
y hospitals.  Many  examples  exist  from  the  SARS
utbreaks  in  a number  of  cities,  from  the  MERS  out-
reaks and,  most  recently,  from  Ebola  outbreaks.
ver the  past  decade  alone,  we  have  witnessed  the
mergence  of  at least  two  novel  inﬂuenza  strains,
wo corona  viruses  and  the  unprecedented  spread
f a known  viral  hemorrhagic  virus,  Ebola.  Despite
he available  resources  in  some  countries,  the
chilles  heel  of  most  healthcare  systems  remains
heir inability  to  predict  and  detect  such  threats,
hen  to  respond  and  manage  them.  The  develop-
ent of  preparedness  plans  that  are  integrated
nto health-care  systems,  regardless  of  how  sim-
le these  healthcare  systems  may  be  in  many  low
ncome  source  countries,  will  be  the  ﬁrst  step
o enable  nations  to  address  the  next  respira-
ory threat.  In  addition,  support  to  implement  the
nternational  Health  Regulation  (IHR)  guidelines  are
esperately needed  if  countries  are  expected  to
ecognize  and  contain  emerging  pathogens.  This
ould be  necessary  to  prevent  these  pathogens
rom becoming  global  threats.
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